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This paper positions itself at the crossroads of three major observations related to Africa’s 
structural transformation challenge.
 Firstly, over the last years African 
economies have been praised for their 
robust growth rates which offer positive 
perspectives for economic development 
and private investment and suggest a 
process of catching-up with the rest of 
the world. However, the quality of this 
growth is a growing issue because it has 
a very limited impact on poverty and 
does not translate so far in a progressive 
structural transformation of African 
economies. 
 Secondly, the role of agriculture 
with regards the continent’s structural 
transformation is to be considered. 
For many countries with an important 
rural population and where agriculture 
continues to count in major aggregates 
and livelihoods, rural and agricultural 
transformation is of course central to this 
agenda. More globally, it is also viewed 
as a necessary step to answer the food 
security challenge of a 9-plus billion 
people world expected in 2050 and to 
The objective of this paper is to discuss Africa’s structural transformation, its food 
and employment challenges, in light of renewed dynamics, more particularly 
China’s involvement in the continent’s agricultural sector. Data is scarce and 
often very contradictory, but what becomes evident is that China’s role in 
agriculture in Africa, and particularly related to the land grab phenomenon, 
is not as significant as initially put to the fore. China promotes an uncertain 
“aid, business, and trade” model where the “business and trade” components 
seem to increasingly take the lead and which are often disconnected from the 
characteristics of the African context. As such, the paper, besides highlighting 
the lasting importance of the rural sector for food security and poverty 
alleviation in a context of Africa’s limited economic diversification, it suggests 
possible stronger Chinese contribution to the policy debate through experience 
sharing and dialogue within Africa and at the global level.
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address the remaining rural poverty. In 
2008, the food price crisis led to a renewed 
interest in agriculture: a multiplication 
of investment projects and increased 
foreign direct investments (FDI) into 
agriculture on the African continent has 
been observed (UNCTAD 2009). Yet, 
there is a great need to take stock of the 
real outcomes for and intentions of all 
those involved.
 Thirdly, beyond economic 
development and agricultural 
production, employment is also a burning 
issue on the African continent. Due to a 
booming labor force, the question of the 
sectors of absorption of growing cohorts 
of youth challenges public policies. This 
employment challenge is recognized 
by the international community, as 
evidenced by the recent publication of 
numerous reference documents—such 
as the World Bank’s World Development 
Report (WDR) (2013) focusing on 
employment (World Bank 2012)—and 
many of them focus on the very specific 
situation of Africa, and more precisely 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), like the 
African Economic Outlook 2012 (AfdB, 
OECD and UNDP 2012) or the special 
report on African youth employment 
(Filmer and Fox 2014).1
 The objective of this paper is to 
discuss these observations in the context 
of Africa’s structural transformation. 
The paper recapitulates first the specifics 
of African structural transformation 
(Section 1), its consequences on the 
employment challenge, and points 
to the remaining and long-lasting 
importance of the rural sector. It 
particularly highlights the challenge of 
agricultural development which is the 
frontline for food security of a growing 
population and a major opportunity for 
generating incomes and contributing 
to poverty alleviation (Section 2). The 
paper then puts in perspective the 
present interventions and dynamics in 
agriculture and impacts on the rural 
sector. To do so, it reviews Chinese 
interventions, investments, and public 
aid (Section 3). Finally, in the framework 
of Africa’s structural transformation, 
the paper addresses the evolving role of 
Chinese cooperation in the rural sector—
between increasing implications in the 
policy dialogue or withdrawal toward a 
business-only perspective—and stresses 
its uncertainties and limitations (Section 
4). 
I - Characteristics of the African 
“structural equation”
SSA is very specific because its structural transformation has been lagging when compared to other 
regions of the world.2 It has experienced 
1 See also the ILO report on employment trends for youth (ILO 2012), the report of the Africa Commis-
sion on the potential of African youth (Africa Commission 2009), the work of the FAO on the employ-
ment of rural youth (Van der Geest 2010), Losch (2012; 2013), and Brooks et al. (2013).
2 The process of structural transformation refers to the change in the sectorial and spatial distribution of 
economic activities. Its stylized summary shows a gradual transition from an agriculture-based econo-
my to one based on industry and then on services, and hence from rural to urban areas. It is illustrated 
by the evolution pathway followed by European economies (and countries of European settlement) and 
replicated in several other parts of the world.
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process of urbanization over the last 50 
years and a rapid economic growth in the 
last decade; but it remains, with South 
Asia, the poorest region in the world.3 
The "African lions" of McKinsey (2010) 
are lightened by 35% of their GDP when 
North Africa is subtracted; and SSA only 
represents 45% of the total wealth of the 
continent when South Africa (20% of the 
overall GDP) is withdrawn. It however 
gathers together 75% of its population.
An incipient economic transition
 When looking at the major 
economic aggregates, SSA structurally 
changed little since the 1960s and remains 
permanently marked by the weight of its 
primary sector and the exploitation of its 
natural resources. Agriculture, mining, 
and energy account for over 50% of GDP 
for 17 countries, between 40% and 50% 
for 9 countries and between 30% and 
40% for 9 others. The manufacturing 
sector is extremely limited: only 18 
countries have an industrial added value 
exceeding 10% of GDP and 7 countries 
reach the threshold of 15%. These 
results show a deep structural inertia, 
where only services and construction—
driven by urban growth—developed. 
SSA is a region of urbanization without 
industrialization, a very specific situation 
in the economic history of the world.
 When compared with East and 
South-East Asian competitors, African 
growth over the last decade was much 
lower, and especially marked by its 
volatility (Arbache and Page 2007), which 
raises the question of the sustainability 
of the recent growth trend (Devarajan 
and Fengler 2013), characterized by the 
position of raw materials, construction 
and services, and the relative weakness 
of investment (Ali and Dadush 2010).
 However, when looking at 
reallocation of labor within or between 
sectors, even if reliable data are missing, 
some countries show a progressive shift 
(McMillan, Rodrik and Verduzco-Gallo 
2014) due to the development of more 
diversified exports with higher value 
and technological contents (Uganda, 
Tanzania, Rwanda, but also Senegal 
or Nigeria). Nevertheless, these slight 
changes in the labor force structure of 
SSA do not modify—in absolute terms—
the remaining importance of agriculture 
in the economically active population. 
With the exception of South Africa, 
where employment in agriculture is 
marginal—for reasons related to the 
very specific history of the country—
agriculture still occupies 50%–60% of 
the labor force in the vast majority of 
SSA. This rate rises to 75% and higher 
in some countries (Sahel, East Africa).4 
Other sectors of employment are mainly 
services (trade and transport first and, 
marginally, government, banking), 
construction and public works boosted 
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3 The current GDP per capita is very low: in 2010, 27 of the 49 countries in SSA were in the low-income 
countries group by the World Bank (< to $1,025/person/year) including 13 countries under $500.
4 The broad definition of agricultural employment does not signify however exclusive occupation in 
agriculture: multiple activities are a characteristic of rural households (Losch, Fréguin-Gresh and White 
2012).
7by urban growth, and handicraft. 
Employment in manufacturing remains 
extremely low—a few hundred thousand 
jobs in most countries (and often less). 
 A cross-sectional feature of this 
employment structure is the importance 
of what is commonly called the informal 
economy. This informal sector is the 
bulk of Sub-Saharan African economies 
because it includes agriculture, which is 
almost exclusively family farming,5 and 
also because urban employment happens 
mainly through self-employment 
activities or small businesses.
An on-going and delayed demographic 
transition
 These low-transforming Afri-
can economies are facing a unique 
demographic reality characterized 
by an unprecedented growth and the 
long-lasting importance of their rural 
population. SSA is the last region of the 
world to be engaged in its process of 
demographic transition and the process 
is far from complete: in 2050, SSA’s 
population should reach a total slightly 
above 2 billion people, and population 
should continue to grow until after 2100. 
SSA will overtake China and have two and 
a half times more people than Europe (a 
reversal of the relative weights of Europe 
and Africa in less than a century).
 This population growth will 
also be accompanied by a change in the 
age structure of the population, with a 
strong growth of the labor force—and 
therefore of the demand for jobs—and a 
progressive improvement of the activity 
ratio (active/inactive people). However, 
this improvement in the activity 
structure of the population will only play 
its leverage role if it is combined with 
adequate public policies and a favorable 
economic and institutional environment 
(productive investment, capacity 
building, innovation, and productivity 
enhancement). If not, the demographic 
bonus (many workers) could turn into 
a "penalty" (many jobless) with major 
social and political tensions.
 The other critical feature 
characterizing African demographic 
changes is the spatial distribution of 
the population. In spite of a strong 
urbanization process (the urban 
population increased 10-fold since 
independence), the subcontinent is 
still mainly rural, with around 65% in 
2010, and it will remain rural until the 
mid-2030s due to a slowing down in the 
pace of urbanization—a consequence of 
limited labor opportunities but low paid 
informal jobs (Magrin 2013). Above all, 
SSA is the only region of the world—with 
South Asia—where rural population will 
continue to grow—a consequence of 
today’s spatial distribution and strong 
birth rates—and it is the only region 
where this growth will continue after 
2050: the region will count 400 million 
additional rural people by that date.
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5 There is a limited business/corporate sector, mainly for agricultural export (agro-industrial planta-
tions, large mechanized farms). It represents little in terms of jobs and even less in relative terms: in 
countries where it is best established (in East and Southern Africa in particular), the numbers rarely 
exceed 100,000 jobs compared to the millions of family farms.
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The “African Equation”
 SSA is facing a continuing 
population growth and a massive change 
in scale: while its population increased 
by 560 million people between 1970 and 
2010, it will increase by 1.1 billion over 
the same time period between 2010 and 
2050 (and possibly more). This means a 
dramatic increase of the food demand and 
questions the capacity of the continent 
to meet the scale in terms of agri-food 
production.
 However, food security being 
more than availability, but also access, 
utilization (nutrition) and stability (of 
availability, access, and utilization), the 
issue of developing income generating 
activities is central in framing adequate 
development strategies. It particularly 
puts the “job challenge” (Bhorat and 
Naidoo 2013) on the frontline: at SSA’s 
level, the yearly cohort of new workers 
entering the labor market,7 is around 
19 million today; it will increase to 27 
million by 2030 and add up to nearly 370 
million (i.e. 50 million more than the 
current population of the United States). 
These are not projections: on a 15-year 
time period, these new workers have 
already been born. Based on the existing 
distribution of population and trends in 
migration to cities, two thirds of these 
new workers should be in rural areas 
(AfDB, OECD and UNDP 2015).
II - The potential and strategic 
role of agriculture
The debate on the most appropriate development strategy for SSA is raging, with extremely contrasting 
points of view between proponents of 
industrialization and the strengthening 
of urban dynamics on the one hand, 
and proponents of "agriculture first" on 
the other hand (Losch 2015). As far as 
the "industrialists" are concerned, only 
manufacturing can meet the scale of the 
challenges facing Africa: agricultural 
productivity is too low and the expected 
progresses too slow to allow for a rapid 
escape from poverty; the solution for the 
future of the rural poor lies in the cities.7
 But it is also important to take 
into account the necessary timeframe 
for an effective industrial development 
with regard to the current structural 
situation. There has not been significant 
industrialization in SSA over the last 50 
years despite significant urbanization. 
Examples of industrial free trade zones 
have produced mixed results and, most 
importantly, they have only helped 
6 The annual cohort of youth entering the working age (15–64)—which is a proxy for entering the labor 
market—or reaching the age of finding an income-generating activity, is one tenth of the 15–24-year 
age group. This is a flow instead of a change in the total number of workers, which takes into account 
people moving from the 15–64-age group to the supposedly inactive 65+ group (a disputable criteria in 
countries without a formal labor market and generalized pension system—the case of SSA).
7 The major arguments for manufacturing refer to the change in the international economic environ-
ment that would offer new opportunities for industrialization: an improved business climate in many 
countries, the gradual increase in manufacturing costs in Asia due to higher wages (especially in Chi-
na), and the prospects offered by task-based production—or light manufacturing (Dinh et al. 2012)—
rather than the manufacture of end products (UNIDO 2008).
9create—depending on the country—tens 
of thousands of jobs whereas hundreds of 
thousands of jobs or millions are required 
annually. It means that the possible new 
comparative cost advantages—which 
will arise very progressively—are not 
enough: heavy investments are needed 
in infrastructure, training, and support 
to businesses; and it will be impossible to 
create millions of industrial jobs each year 
in the near future to meet the demand for 
jobs.8
 This situation consolidates the 
remaining role of agriculture and the rural 
sector in the development of the continent. 
In Africa, over the last five decades, food 
production has essentially kept pace with 
population and urban growth thanks to 
the expansion of cultivated areas, but also 
to higher yields. However, the gradual 
decline in food production per capita,9 
which is offset by imports, raises the 
question of the capacity to respond to 
population increase while the cultivated 
area per worker is getting smaller due to 
a growing rural population (Dorin 2013). 
Growing imports have firstly answered 
the urban demand. Nevertheless, if 
African cities are heavily dependent on 
international markets, their dependence 
is mainly a concern for the supply of 
cereals. Surveys in West Africa capital 
cities in 2008 have demonstrated that food 
expenditure is roughly divided into three 
equal categories: cereals and starchy foods 
(roots, tubers, and plantains); animal 
products (meat, fish, dairy, and eggs); and 
products for sauce (vegetables, pulses, oils, 
fruits, sugar, and condiments). For the 
latter two categories and also for starchy 
foods, local products are predominant 
(Bricas 2013).
 Based on these results and going 
back to the demographic prospects, the 
characteristics of the African population 
growth will give huge opportunities 
for the agriculture of the continent, for 
African farmers, and African food chains. 
Between 2015 and 2050, the continent 
will gain 1.2 billion new consumers and 
the progressive urbanization—even if 
relatively slower than in other regions 
of the world—will change the urban/
rural population ratio (U/R) which is a 
proxy for the market potential for African 
farmers. While U/R is 0.6 today, the ratio 
will double and reach 1.2 in 2050: this is 
a dramatic pull factor for agriculture and 
a huge incentive for developing farming 
activities and agro-processing.
 These existing trends raise however 
the strategic question of identifying the 
most appropriate development model for 
agriculture in Africa. New investments 
by new players promoting large-scale 
farming (Anseeuw et al. 2012) have 
reopened the old “small versus large 
scale” debate about the relative merits of 
different sizes and types of farms. This 
risky discussion—which could result in 
adopting inappropriate modernization 
pathways—tends to obscure a central 
issue: the need to increase production, 
while creating employment in agriculture, 
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8 In the case of China, the “township and villages enterprises” policy, which was the backbone of rural 
industrialization, is an interesting yardstick: between the 1960s, when the policy was initiated, and the 
1990s a maximum of 135 million jobs were created (Vendryes 2012).
9 Plant-based food production per capita declined by almost 0.1% per year between 1970 and 2007.
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as well as in upstream and downstream 
activities, by strengthening value chains 
and improving the incomes of farmers—
which are the levers of rural demand and 
economic diversification (Losch, Fréguin-
Gresh and White 2012). This need gives 
a priority for public policies: support 
first family farming and help farmers to 
deal with the existing risky environment 
(natural, economic, and institutional) 
through adequate infrastructure and 
services, improved markets (information 
and regulation when needed), and 
“smooth” subsidies (for accessing credit, 
insurance, and inputs). Drafting the 
adequate policies will be more than 
providing technical solutions.
III - China in rural Africa: myths 
and realities
In that specific context, what has been and what is the contribution of China, which is one of the most visible 
and scrutinized foreign player, to the 
development of agriculture and the rural 
sector?
 Data is scarce and often very 
contradictory, but what becomes more 
evident is that China’s role in agriculture 
in Africa, and particularly related to 
the land grab phenomenon, is not as 
significant as initially put to the fore. As 
shown by the Land Matrix (2014), China 
would be ranked 6th if number of deals 
are concerned and only ranked about 15th 
if the area is considered (see Figure 1), 
making it not one of the major players and 
investors, without an offensive strategy, 
in agriculture and land on the continent 
(Anseeuw et al. 2012; Gabas 2014).
 This first observation is confirmed 
by China’s foreign aid as detailed in its 
White Papers of 2011 and 2014 (PRC 
2011; 2014). The amount of foreign aid 
allocated to agriculture remained and is at 
present relatively low. Indeed, according 
to the White Paper of 2011, agriculture 
represented only 4.3%—i.e., $52.6 million 
for all developing countries—of the 
cumulated Chinese concessional loans 
until 2009 (PRC 2011). Although no 
disaggregated agricultural information 
is available for Africa, aid for the sector 
globally would account for about 2% 
between 2012 and 2014 (see Figures 2 and 
3).10
 This being said, the multiple 
projects and actors, either public or 
private, implicated in China or on the 
ground in Africa, show that agriculture is 
certainly not being ignored by China. This 
is illustrated by the numerous projects 
mentioned in China’s White Papers (PRC 
2011; 2014).11
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10  There is no disaggregated data for agriculture in Africa, knowing that China’s foreign aid to Africa 
accounted for 46% of China’s total aid in 2009 (See China’s White Paper 2011 (PRC 2011)) and even 52% 
($7.7 billion) during the period 2010–2012 (See China’s White Paper 2014 (PRC, 2014)).
11 According to the two White Papers (PRC 2011; 2014), agriculture has always been a target of Chinese 
cooperation. Until 2009, China implemented 221 projects focused on agriculture in developing coun-
tries: 35 farms, 47 centers of experimentation and development of agricultural technology, 11 livestock 
projects, 15 fishery projects, 47 irrigation projects, and 66 other unspecified agricultural projects—as 
well as supply of farm equipment. Between 2010 and 2012, China developed 49 new projects in agricul-
ture: 25 agricultural demonstration centers, 21 irrigation projects, and 2 projects based on the transfor-
mation of agricultural products (Gabas and Ribier 2015a; 2015b).
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Figure 1: Countries of origin and large-scale land-based investments, according to 
size and number of deals
Source: Land Matrix (2014)
Figure 2 and 3: Breakdown of China’s foreign aid by sectors

























 Three models of cooperation can 
be identified.12 The first one, representing 
the major cooperation model adopted by 
China, is related to China’s agricultural 
demonstration centers, through which 
they tend to present a combination 
of “aid, business, and trade.” As such, 
the model articulates itself around the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM—
who is providing financial aid), Chinese 
provincial companies implementing 
the demonstration centers, and 
international trade with China which 
is developing with imports of (hybrid) 
seed, phytosanitary inputs, fertilizers, 
agricultural machinery—as well as, in 
certain cases, the export of agricultural 
produce. These centers are relatively 
young: they were decided during the 2006 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) and financed at different 
paces. For the 25 centers planned, most 
constructions are engaged (offices, labs, 
post-harvest facilities, lecture rooms, 
etc.), additional rural development 
operations (irrigation systems, roads, 
etc.) have been initiated, and 10 centers 
are already effectively functioning (see 
annex). In these centers, experts often 
coming from the very same province per 
host country/center (for example Hubei 
in Mozambique) have been deployed, 
although effective capacity building and 
dissemination is still often lacking.13 
After the establishment (financed by 
MOFCOM), first experimentations and 
then capacity and dissemination phases 
(co-financed by MOFCOM and the 
host country research/capacity building 
bodies), subsequent phases focus on 
rendering the centers financially auto-
sufficient and autonomous and, finally, on 
the transfer to host authorities. As such, 
these demonstration centers characterize 
an effective but fragile cooperation tool 
because without Chinese Government 
support their financial sustainability is 
not guaranteed.14 This cooperation model 
is also unclear. For example, in the case 
of Cameroon, capacity transfer activities 
are articulated with an investment 
company — Shanxi Overseas — in which 
the primary mandate is profit generation 
but is also supposed to finance activities 
related to China’s cooperation.
 A second model is piloted by 
public/private enterprises15 in charge of 
developing agricultural projects, such 
as Sinochem in Cameroon producing 
natural rubber, or Sinto in Togo 
producing sugar. Although not massive as 
it is in infrastructures, this project-based 
cooperation in agriculture is growing 
and is rapidly diversifying. Indeed, the 
interventions are presently focusing on 
an increasing number of agricultural 
12 This analysis is based on a joint AFD-Cirad research project focusing on Western and Southern Af-
rica which resulted in the development of a database of 250 public and private projects in agriculture 
financed by Chinese funds (Gabas and Ribier 2015a; 2015b).
13 Number of experts is around 10 by center. In Mozambique, the “oldest” center, training and extension 
already started (with 10 staff), while operations will only start in 2015 in Cameroon (15 experts are 
expected).
14 Principles, development, funding, and replicability lack of evaluation.
15 The distinction between the public or private character of these enterprises is difficult.
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sub-sectors responding to various market 
demands, whether they are Chinese (in 
particular for cotton, groundnut, cassava, 
wine), international (rubber), or local/
regional in Africa (sugar, horticulture, 
rice, poultry, pork, fisheries). In the two 
cases mentioned here above, both local 
economic development and the financing 
of local public goods are fully supported 
by the Chinese enterprises. Local 
employment is significant and Chinese 
foremen or managers have been replaced 
with local ones.16
 These two main cooperation 
models are finally accompanied by a 
wave of smaller, private, entrepreneurial 
investments, particularly in poultry and 
pork production, the stock taking of 
which is obviously more difficult. These 
entrepreneurs also employ local labor, 
but the quantification of these dynamics 
and their impact on employment is still 
rather unknown.
 Chinese engagement in agri-
culture in Africa is thus not as clear 
cut as often projected. Not only does it 
remain rather small, it varies significantly 
according to actors, sectors, and activities. 
This is all the more true as China seems 
still unsure which cooperation model 
to engage in, leading the latter to vary 
rapidly. Indeed, firstly, although Chinese 
companies establish themselves to stay, 
several enterprises, judging risks and/
or losses to be significant, have lately 
decided to relocate their activities toward 
other countries, in Africa or beyond. It is 
the case of South Africa, where several 
Chinese companies recently settled 
into primary agricultural production 
(fishery, wine, cereal, fruits projects). 
Secondly, Chinese companies have 
adopted strategies allowing them to 
control production, without engaging in 
the riskier land-based investments. As 
such, a large part of Zimbabwe’s cotton 
and tobacco production is produced 
under contract farming agreements with 
Chinese companies, linking smallholders 
and Chinese companies (Mukwereza 
2013). Another strategy is centered 
on the acquisition of equity shares 
in stable companies and investment 
endeavors, as seen in some South African 
cooperatives and enterprises. This new 
approach allows Chinese companies to 
develop sector engagement and primary 
production control through the input and 
commercialization channels.
IV - The evolving role of China in 
the rural and food policy debate: 
from outsider to contributor?
This review and tentative stock-taking exercise of Chinese interventions in the rural sector 
provide a mixed picture.
 First, agriculture represents only 
a small part of Chinese cooperation: it 
concerns a small amount of funds (even 
if regional breakdowns are not available) 
spread in many diversified projects, whose 
leverage power is necessarily limited.
Africa’s Structural Transformation Challenge and the Role of Agriculture
16 In Togo, sugar cane company SINTO employs 280 people on a full-time basis, but during harvest this 
can increase to 1,200. In Cameroon, HEVECAM (whose capital is owned by SINOCHEM) employs 
about 6,000 workers. SUDCAM, also owned by SINOCHEM, producing natural rubber presently on 
4,000 ha but will expand to 32,000 ha by 2025, 96% of the employees are Cameroonian.
14
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 Second, China promotes an 
uncertain “aid, business, and trade” 
model where the “business and trade” 
components seem to increasingly take 
the lead as shown by a growing activity 
of Chinese companies both on the inputs 
side (with development of seeds and 
fertilizers supply) and the product side 
(with development of purchase networks 
targeting specific products such as cotton, 
groundnuts, and cassava for export). In 
addition, and more and more prominently, 
Chinese demonstration centers in Africa 
are playing another role: they represent a 
source of information aiming at reducing 
transaction costs for Chinese companies 
with no experience in Africa to establish 
themselves on the continent.
 Third, Chinese cooperation seems 
disconnected from the characteristics of 
the African context and far away from a 
comprehensive approach of local realities. 
The demonstration centers provide a good 
example of the tentative dissemination of a 
technical package directly inspired by the 
Green revolution, focusing on techniques 
and inputs without taking into account 
imperfect and incomplete factor markets, 
providing the latter and additional 
public goods only on limited project 
basis. China’s relatively blind practice, 
disconnected from the agrarian situations 
and the overall structural realities, is 
an obstacle for broad-based reflections 
around the host country’s development 
trajectories, in particular related to labor 
and labor absorption into agriculture and 
the definition of an effective development 
model for the agricultural sector. So far, 
the few isolated projects are not facilitating 
a contribution to the debate on structural 
transformation, food security, rural 
poverty alleviation, and the development 
of a vibrant rural economy.
 Lastly, China’s cooperation system 
seems to be working in isolation without 
any consultation with other donors or 
local stakeholders, such as rural producers’ 
organizations or NGOs. This gap with 
other players has prevented experience 
and information sharing, adaptation to 
local realities, and undermines Chinese 
aid effectiveness and its contribution to 
major African challenges. Particularly, this 
disconnection prevents learning from the 
Chinese experience and from engaging a 
dialogue about how China did manage its 
rural transformation and reach its food 
security.
 In a context where donors are 
progressively re-engaging in support 
to policymaking processes, following 
a growing focus of African institutions 
on strategies—and a rising concern 
about implementing a “transformative 
agenda” (e.g., African Union, AfDB, 
and ECA)—Chinese cooperation could 
possibly initiate a progressive implication 
in support to policies toward rural 
transformation and food security. This 
move would be a major shift with regard 
to a long-lasting positioning favoring 
non-interference. This possible evolution 
is demonstrated by the implication of 
Chinese experts in agriculture policy 
design as in Benin, Botswana, and Bissau 
Guinea. A similar development is observed 
in Mauritania, where experts contributed 
to the development of a research center 
dedicated to agricultural policy, or in 
Senegal where technical assistance is 
provided to the ministry of agriculture. 
Lately, at an international level, it has 
also engaged in a dialogue with other 
official donors over the last years, mainly 
multilateral channels. This is particularly 
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the case with FAO, the World Bank and 
IFAD, with whom closer cooperation 
is being established in countries such 
as Mozambique and Cameroon. Other 
cooperations are within the BRICS group 
(with the establishment of an international 
bank) or through China’s implication in 
DAC/OECD working groups.
 Two last points deserve to be 
mentioned here. The first one concerns 
the production of knowledge in China on 
issues related to agricultural development 
and cooperation in Africa. Numerous 
Chinese academics are more and more 
connected with European and American 
research, in a lesser extent with Africa 
(the main academic partnership in related 
fields is developed with Stellenbosch 
University in South Africa). An increasing 
porosity can be observed between the 
two academic worlds, besides others 
through the exchange of students and the 
participation in various think-tanks.17 
Academics exchange on cooperation 
experiences, publish in international 
journals and, being themselves strongly 
linked to the Chinese authorities, 
significant changes with regard to Chinese 
Cooperation in Africa can be expected. It 
could particularly benefit from a growing 
agenda focusing on rural transformation 
and how the latter can be a major engine 
for food security. Secondly, during the 
Addis Ababa conference on financing 
development (July 2015), the Chinese 
President announced several initiatives 
in order to intensify South–South 
cooperation, in particular with Africa in 
the field of agriculture.
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Country Chinese company Development stage Size 





Angola Xinjiang Beixin Group October 2012 signed agreement 54 ha 
Benin China National Agricultural Development Group 
February 2010 
building achieved 51.6 ha 
Cameroon Shannxi Agriculture Group (initially Shannxi Overseas Investment) 
January 2010 building 
achieved 100 ha 





Congo Chinese Academy of Tropical Agricultural Science March 2011 
To be 
decided 
Côte d’Ivoire Undefined February 2012 feasibility study 
To be 
decided 
Eritrea Undefined feasibility study To be decided 
Ethiopia Guangxi Bagui Agricultural Technology Ltd. 
June 2012 
Delivered 52 ha 
Equatorial Guinea Jiangxi Ganliang Industrial Ltd. No data No data 
Liberia LongPing High-Tech Group July 2010 Delivered 
Facility of 
26.000 m2 
Madagascar Hunan Academy of Agricultural Science No data No data 
Malawi Qingdao Ruichang Cotton Company July 2012 building in progress 50 ha 
Mali Jiangsu Redbud Spinning Technology Ltd. 
July 2012 
building in progress No data 
Mauritania 
(agricultural center) Mudanjiang Yanlin Farm Technology Ltd. 
November 2012 
building started 50 ha 
Mauritania 
(livestock center) Undefined feasibility study 
To be 
decided 
Mozambique Hubei Lianfeng Overseas Agricultural Development Ltd. 
July 2011 
Delivered 52 ha 
Uganda Sichuan Huaqiao Phoenix Group Ltd. December 2010 Facility of 3.000 m2 
DRC 
 Zonergy Company Limited 
July 2012 
building in progress 60 ha 
Rwanda Fujian Agricultural & Forestry University August 2011 22.6 ha 
Sudan 
China Shandong International Economic 
& Technical Cooperation Group Ltd. 
Shandong Academy of Agricultural 
Sciences 
June 2011 
Delivered 65 ha 
Tanzania Chongqing Zhongyi Seed Co. Ltd. April 2011 Delivered 62 ha 
Togo Jiangxi Huachang Infrastructure Ltd. April 2012 Delivered 10 ha 
Zambia Jilin Agricultural University January 2011 Delivered 120 ha 
Zimbabwe Chinese Academy of Agricultural Mechanization Sciences April 2012 109 ha 
 
Annex: The 25 agricultural demonstration centers in Africa
